Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.  

*  For the British history, see in particular the chapter III in the part II: “La petite guerre des Alliés, vue par les sources anglaises en 1747“ (text in French). Cf. Table of contents, HERE.

*  See also in the book the appendix 9 (text in English): « Account of what happen’d at Nispen behouxt a Detachment of French Infantry, and Col. Frangipani’s Hussars & the English F. Companies who were order’d to maintain that post. Augst 10.th 1747 », 2 pages. Extract from: RA CP (Windsor), box 25, document 264. Cf. List of the appendices, HERE.